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During times of crisis, such as wars, natural disasters or pan-demics, citizens look to leaders for guidance. Successful crisis management often depends on mobilizing individual 
citizens to change their behaviours and make personal sacrifices 
for the public good1. Crucial to this endeavour is trust: citizens are 
more likely to follow official guidance when they trust their lead-
ers2. Here, we investigate public trust in leaders in the context of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to threaten millions of lives 
around the globe at the time of writing3,4.
Because the novel coronavirus is highly transmissible, a criti-
cal factor in limiting pandemic spread is compliance with public 
health recommendations such as social distancing, physical hygiene 
and mask wearing5,6. Trust in leaders is a strong predictor of citi-
zen compliance with a variety of public health policies7–12. During 
pandemics, trust in experts issuing public health guidelines is a key 
predictor of compliance with those guidelines. For example, dur-
ing the avian influenza pandemic of 2009 (H1N1), self-reported 
trust in medical organizations predicted self-reported compliance 
with protective health measures and vaccination rates13,14. During 
the COVID-19 pandemic, data from several countries show that 
public trust in scientists, doctors and the government is positively 
associated with self-reported compliance with public health 
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concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Across both the self-report and behavioural measures, endorsement of instrumental harm 
decreased trust, while endorsement of impartial beneficence increased trust. These results show how support for different 
ethical principles can impact trust in leaders, and inform effective public communication during times of global crisis.
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recommendations15–18. These data suggest that trust in leaders is 
likely to be a key predictor of long-term success in containing the 
COVID-19 pandemic around the globe. However, the factors that 
determine trust in leaders during global crises remain understudied.
One possible determinant of trust in leaders during a crisis is 
how they resolve moral dilemmas that pit distinct ethical prin-
ciples against one another. The COVID-19 pandemic has raised 
particularly stark dilemmas of this kind, for instance whether to 
prioritize young and otherwise healthy people over older people 
and those with chronic illnesses when allocating scarce medical 
treatments19,20. This dilemma and similar others highlight a tension 
between two major approaches to ethics. Consequentialist theories 
– of which utilitarianism is the most well-known exemplar21 – posit 
that only consequences should matter when making moral deci-
sions. Because younger, healthier people are more likely to recover 
and have longer lives ahead of them, utilitarians would argue that 
they should be prioritized for care because this is likely to pro-
duce the best overall consequences22–24. In contrast, non-utilitarian 
theories of morality, such as deontological theories25–29, argue that 
morality should consider more than just consequences, including 
rights, duties and obligations (see Supplementary Note 1 for further 
details). Non-utilitarians, on deontological grounds, could argue 
that everyone who is eligible (for example, by being a citizen and/or 
contributing through taxes or private health insurance) has an equal 
right to receive medical care, and therefore it is wrong to prioritize 
some over others30. While it is unlikely that ordinary citizens explic-
itly think about moral issues in terms of specific ethical theories21,31, 
past work shows that these philosophical concepts explain sub-
stantial variance in the moral judgements of ordinary citizens32,33, 
including those in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic34.
There is robust evidence that people who endorse utilitarian 
principles in sacrificial dilemmas – deeming it morally acceptable to 
sacrifice some lives to save many others – are seen as less moral and 
trustworthy, chosen less frequently as social partners and trusted 
less in economic exchanges than people who take a non-utilitarian 
position and reject sacrificing some to save many35–40. This suggests 
that leaders who take a utilitarian approach to COVID-19 dilem-
mas will be trusted less than leaders who take a non-utilitarian 
approach. Anecdotally, some recent case studies of public commu-
nications are consistent with this hypothesis. In the United States, 
for example, public discussions around whether to reopen schools 
and the economy versus remain in lockdown highlighted tensions 
between utilitarian approaches and other ethical principles, with 
some leaders stressing an imperative to remain in lockdown to pre-
vent deaths from COVID-19 (consistent with deontological princi-
ples) but others arguing that lockdown also has costs and these need 
to be weighed against the costs of pandemic-related deaths (con-
sistent with utilitarian principles; Supplementary Note 2). Those 
who appealed to utilitarian arguments – such as President Donald 
Trump, who argued “we cannot let the cure be worse than the prob-
lem itself ”41 and Texas Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick, who sug-
gested that older Americans might be “willing to take a chance” on 
their survival for the sake of their grandchildrens’ economic pros-
pects42 – were met with widespread public outrage43. Likewise, when 
leaders in Italy suggested prioritizing young and healthy COVID-19 
patients over older patients when ventilators became scarce, they 
were intensely criticized by the public44. Mandatory contact trac-
ing policies, which have been proposed on utilitarian grounds, have 
also faced strong public criticisms about infringement of individual 
rights to privacy45–47.
While past research and recent case studies suggest that utilitar-
ian approaches to pandemic dilemmas are likely to erode trust in 
leaders, other evidence suggests this conclusion may be premature. 
First, some work shows that utilitarians are perceived as more com-
petent than non-utilitarians38, and to the extent that trust in lead-
ers is related to perceptions of their competence2, it is possible that 
utilitarian approaches to pandemic dilemmas will increase rather 
than decrease trust in leaders. Second, utilitarianism has at least 
two distinct dimensions: it permits harming innocent individuals 
to maximize aggregate utility (‘instrumental harm’), and it treats 
the interests of all individuals as equally important (‘impartial 
beneficence’)21,33. Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests these two 
dimensions characterize the way ordinary people think about moral 
dilemmas in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic34. These two 
dimensions of utilitarianism not only are psychologically distinct 
in the general public33 but also have distinct impacts on perception 
of leaders. Specifically, when people endorse (versus reject) utilitar-
ian principles in the domain of instrumental harm they are seen as 
worse political leaders, but in some cases are seen as better political 
leaders when they endorse utilitarian principles in the domain of 
impartial beneficence37.
Another dilemma that pits utilitarian principles against other 
non-utilitarian principles – this time in the domain of impartial 
beneficence – is whether leaders should prioritize their own citizens 
over people in other countries when allocating scarce resources. 
The utilitarian sole focus on consequences mandates a strict form 
of impartiality: the mere fact that someone is one’s friend (or their 
mother or fellow citizen) does not imply that they have any obliga-
tions to such a person that they do not have to any and all persons48. 
Faced with a decision about whether to help a friend (or family 
member or fellow citizen) or instead provide an equal or slightly 
larger benefit to a stranger, this strict utilitarian impartiality means 
that one cannot morally justify favouring the person closer to them. 
In contrast, many non-utilitarian approaches explicitly incorporate 
these notions of special obligations, recognizing the relationships 
between people as morally significant. Here, President Trump went 
against utilitarian principles when he ordered a major company 
developing personal protective equipment (PPE) to stop distribut-
ing it to other countries who needed it49, or when he ordered the US 
government to buy up all the global stocks of the COVID-19 treat-
ment remdesivir50. His actions generated outrage across the world 
and stood in contrast to statements from many other Western lead-
ers at the time. The Prime Minister of the UK, Boris Johnson, for 
example, endorsed impartial beneficence when he argued for the 
imperative to “ensure that the world’s poorest countries have the 
support they need to slow the spread of the virus” (3 June 2020)51. In 
a similar vein, the Dutch government donated 50 million euros to 
the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, an organiza-
tion that aims to distribute vaccines equally across the world52.
In sum, public trust in leaders is likely to be a crucial determi-
nant of successful pandemic response and may depend in part on 
how leaders approach the many moral dilemmas that arise during 
a pandemic. Utilitarian responses to such dilemmas may erode or 
enhance trust relative to non-utilitarian approaches, depending on 
whether they concern instrumental harm or impartial beneficence. 
Past research on trust and utilitarianism is insufficient to understand 
how utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas influence trust during 
the COVID-19 pandemic – and future crises – for several reasons. 
First, it has relied on highly artificial moral dilemmas, such as the 
‘trolley problem’53,54, that most people have not encountered in their 
daily lives. Thus, the findings of past studies may not generalize 
to the context of a global health crisis, where everyone around the 
world is directly impacted by the moral dilemmas that arise during 
a pandemic. Second, because the vast majority of previous work on 
trust in utilitarians has focused on instrumental harm, we know little 
about how impartial beneficence impacts trust. Third, most previous 
work on this topic has focused on trust in ordinary people. However, 
there is evidence that utilitarianism differentially impacts percep-
tions of ordinary people and leaders37,38,40, which means we cannot 
generalize from past research on trust in utilitarians to a leadership 
context. Because leaders have power to resolve moral dilemmas 
through policymaking, and therefore can have far more impact on the 
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outcomes of public health crises than ordinary people can, it is espe-
cially important to understand how leaders’ approaches to moral 
dilemmas impact trust. Finally, past work on inferring trust from 
moral decisions has been conducted in just a handful of Western 
populations – in the United States, Belgium, and Germany – and so 
may not generalize to other countries that are also affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. We need, therefore, to assess cross-cultural 
stability by testing this hypothesis in different countries around the 
world. Indeed, given observations of cultural variation in the willing-
ness to endorse sacrificial harm32, it is not a foregone conclusion that 
utilitarian decisions will impact trust in leaders universally. For fur-
ther details of how the present work advances our understanding of 
moral dilemmas and trust in leaders, see Supplementary Notes 3–5.
The goal of the current research is to test the hypothesis that 
endorsement of instrumental harm would decrease trust in leaders 
while endorsement of impartial beneficence would increase trust 
in leaders, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Testing this 
hypothesis across a diverse set of 22 countries spanning six conti-
nents (Fig. 1a and Supplementary Fig. 1) in November–December 
2020, we aim to inform how leaders around the globe can com-
municate with their constituencies in ways that will preserve trust 
during global crises. Given the public health consequences of mis-
trust in leaders7–9, if our hypothesis is confirmed, leaders may wish 
to carefully consider weighing in publicly on moral dilemmas that 
are unresolvable with policy, because their opinions might erode 
citizens’ trust in other pronouncements that may be more pressing, 
such as advice to comply with public health guidelines.
To test our hypothesis empirically, we drew on case studies 
of public communications to identify five moral dilemmas that 
have been actively debated during the COVID-19 pandemic 
(Fig. 1c). Three of these dilemmas involve instrumental harm: 
the Ventilators dilemma concerns whether younger individu-
als should be prioritized to receive intensive medical care over 
older individuals when medical resources such as ventilators are 
scarce23,44, the Lockdown dilemma concerned whether to consider 
reopening schools and the economy or remain in lockdown23,55 
and the Tracing dilemma concerned whether it should be man-
datory for residents to carry devices that continuously trace the 
wearer’s movements, allowing the government to immediately 
identify people who have potentially been exposed to the coro-
navirus45–47. The other two dilemmas involved impartial benefi-
cence: the PPE dilemma concerned whether PPE manufactured 
within a particular country should be reserved for that country’s 
citizens under conditions of scarcity, or sent where it is most 
needed23,56–58, and the Medicine dilemma concerned whether a 
novel COVID-19 treatment developed within a particular coun-
try should be delivered with priority to that country’s citizens, 
or shared impartially around the world56,59,60. Participants in our 
studies read about leaders who endorsed either utilitarian or 
non-utilitarian solutions to the dilemmas (Table 1) and subse-
quently completed behavioural and self-report measures of trust 
in the respective leaders (Extended Data Fig. 1). For example, 
some read about a leader who endorsed prioritizing younger over 
older people for scarce ventilators and were then asked how much 
they trusted that leader. While there are many similar dilemmas 
potentially relevant to the COVID-19 crisis, we chose to focus 
on the five described above because they (1) have been publicly 
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Fig. 1 | Overview of experimental methods. a, Regions of recruitment for online samples broadly nationally representative with respect to age and gender. 
KSA, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. UAE, the United Arab Emirates. b, Running 7-day average of new COVID-19 confirmed global infections from 29 
January 2020 to 14 March 2021, with highlighted data collection window (red; from 26 November 2020 to 22 December 2020). Number of COVID-19 
confirmed infections were taken from the COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University71 
(last update 14 March 2021). c, Summary of the five COVID-19 dilemmas employed in the experimental tasks. d, Voting task: participants were asked to 
vote for a leader who would later be entrusted with a group’s charitable donation and be able to ‘embezzle’ some of the donation money for themselves.
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planned sample. For further details of why we chose these specific 
dilemmas and how they can test our theoretical predictions, see 
Supplementary Notes 2 and 6–9.
We measured trust in two complementary ways. First, we asked 
participants to self-report their general trust in the leaders, in terms 
of both an overall character judgement (“How trustworthy do you 
think this person is?”) and how likely they would be to trust this 
person on other issues not related to the dilemma (“How likely 
would you be to trust this person’s advice on other issues?”). Second, 
we used a novel, incentivized voting task designed to measure pub-
lic trust in leaders (Fig. 1d). Following past work, we define lead-
ers as people who are responsible for making decisions on behalf 
of a group61,62. In the voting task, participants were invited to cast 
a vote to appoint a leader who would be responsible for making a 
charitable donation on behalf of a group. Crucially, the leader had 
the opportunity to ‘embezzle’ some of the donation money for 
themselves. Participants were asked to vote for either a person who 
endorsed a utilitarian or a non-utilitarian position on a COVID-
19 dilemma; the person who received the most votes would have 
control over the group’s donation. By measuring preferences for a 
leader who was responsible for a group’s donations to help those 
in need, the voting task captures trust in leaders in a specific con-
text that is highly relevant to our central research question: during 
a health crisis, effective leadership requires responsible steward-
ship of public resources to help those in need. For further details of 
why we designed our trust measures in this way, see Supplementary 
Notes 10–12.
Our analyses therefore tested two complementary hypotheses. 
First, we predicted that self-reported trust would be lower for leaders 
who endorse utilitarian over non-utilitarian approaches to dilem-
mas involving instrumental harm, while the reverse pattern would 
be observed for impartial beneficence, with greater trust for leaders 
who endorse utilitarian approaches to dilemmas involving impartial 
beneficence (hypothesis 1). Second, we predicted that participants 
would be less likely to vote for leaders who endorse utilitarian over 
non-utilitarian views on dilemmas involving instrumental harm, 
while the reverse pattern would be observed for dilemmas involv-
ing impartial beneficence (hypothesis 2). Pilot studies conducted in 
the United States and the United Kingdom in July 2020 provided 
initial support for these hypotheses (see Pilot Data in Supplementary 
Information and Supplementary Figs. 2–6 for details). All analyses 
controlled for participants’ demographics and own policy prefer-
ences in each dilemma (Table 2).
Finally, we note that the framing of both the self-report and 
behavioural measures of trust are deliberately unrelated to the pan-
demic dilemmas we use to highlight the moral commitments of the 
leader. This crucial design choice allowed us to measure the impact 
of utilitarian versus non-utilitarian endorsements of pandemic 
dilemmas on subsequent trust in leaders. In this way, the current 
design illuminates an important real-life question: if a leader weighs 
in publicly on a moral dilemma during a crisis, how likely are they 
to be trusted later on other matters of public concern?
Results
Analysed dataset. Donations task. A few days prior to running the 
main experiment, we recruited a convenience sample of donor par-
ticipants (total N = 100; 58 women, 40 men, 2 with another gen-
der identity; mean age 33.95 years) in the United States via Prolific 
(www.prolific.co). The donor participants chose to contribute a total 
of US$87.89 to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). We 
displayed this amount to voter participants in the main experiment.
Participants. Following the pre-registered sampling plan (Methods), 
we recruited participants via several online survey platforms from 
26 November 2020 to 22 December 2020, as new cases of COVID-19 
in 2020 were peaking globally (Fig. 1b). In total, we recruited a sam-
ple of 24,809 participants across the following countries: Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, India, 
Israel, Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, the United 
Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States (Fig. 1a 
and Supplementary Tables 1 and 2).
As specified in our pre-registered sampling plan (Methods), 
participants who did not pass the attention checks were screened 
out immediately prior to beginning the survey, but due to plat-
form and institutional review board requirements, participants 
in the United States and the United Kingdom were able to com-
plete the survey even if they failed such checks, and so they were 
Table 1 | Summary of moral arguments in COViD-19 dilemmas
Dilemma Argument type
instrumental harm (iH) utilitarian Non-utilitarian
Lockdown “We need to think about all the consequences. 
Preventing deaths from COVID isn’t all that matters, 
and continuing these prolonged restrictions will have a 
far worse effect on our overall well-being.”
“As leaders, our primary duty is to protect our citizens. We 
must think of our responsibilities to one another, and we 
cannot sacrifice some of our most vulnerable people in 
pursuit of the greater good.”
Ventilators “We have to think about how we can do the most good 
with the resources we have, and that means prioritizing 
those people who have the best chance of recovering 
and living a long and healthy life.”
“It’s not our place to choose who lives. Everyone has the 
same right to receive equal access to treatment, and we 
cannot abandon our most vulnerable in an effort to save 
more lives.”
Tracing “We need to control the pandemic, and sometimes 
you have to sacrifice the right to privacy for the greater 
good.”
“Everyone has a right to privacy, and we cannot sacrifice 
this right in an effort to control the pandemic.”
impartial beneficence (iB) utilitarian Non-utilitarian
Medicine “COVID-19 is a global pandemic that affects all humans 
equally. We need to be impartial and send treatment 
where it can achieve the greatest good.”
“We have a right to use our own resources to help our own 
citizens before everyone else. Other countries can produce 
their own treatments for COVID-19.”
Personal protective equipment “COVID-19 is a global pandemic that affects all humans. 
We need to be impartial in how we distribute resources 
like PPE and send it where it can achieve the greatest 
good.”
“We have a duty to protect our own citizens first, not 
everyone in the world. Other countries are responsible for 
protecting their own citizens from COVID-19.”
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excluded post hoc, after data collection (N = 101 for attention 
check 1, N = 118 for attention check 2). In addition, participants 
were excluded according to our exclusion criteria if they (1) took 
the survey more than once (N = 565), (2) reported living in a 
country different from that of intended recruitment (N = 96, of 
which 4 did not answer the question) or (3) failed to answer more 
than 50% of the questions (N = 0). The sample size after apply-
ing these exclusion criteria was 23,929; we then excluded partici-
pants from specific analyses if they (4) did not provide a response 
for one of our main dependent variables (N = 177 for self-report, 
N = 201 for voting) or (5) failed the comprehension check for the 
task being analysed (Design; N = 6,161 for self-report, N = 11,090 
for voting). This resulted in a total final sample of N = 17,591 for 
the self-report task and N = 12,638 for the voting task. Crucially, 
the comprehension check failure rates were balanced across 
experimental conditions for each task (failure rate for self-report 
task comprehension check: 25.30% after instrumental harm 
dilemmas, utilitarian argument (final N = 4,499); 26.08% after 
instrumental harm, non-utilitarian argument (final N = 4,299); 
25.25% after impartial beneficence, utilitarian argument (final 
N = 4,461); 27.13% after impartial beneficence, non-utilitarian 
argument (final N = 4,332); fail rate for voting task comprehen-
sion check: 46.46% after instrumental harm dilemmas (final 
N = 6,373); 47.02% after impartial beneficence dilemmas (final 
N = 6,265)).
Representativeness. As stated in the stage 1 report, while we aimed 
to recruit samples broadly representative for age and gender in all 
countries, we anticipated that it would be difficult to obtain fully 
representative quotas in all countries for some demographic catego-
ries. To evaluate the representativeness of our samples across age 
and gender categories, we examined the differences between our 
targeted quotas (based on available published population character-
istics) and actual quotas in the data, separately for each country. We 
achieved broadly representative samples for gender, with most dif-
ferences between the observed and targeted proportions being less 
than or equal to 5% in all but two countries (Singapore and the United 
Arab Emirates). Note that, because available population data across 
countries primarily report binary gender categories, our estimates 
of representativeness were not able to account for those identifying 
as non-binary, which is a limitation. Similarly, in 15 countries we 
obtained broadly representative samples for age, with the difference 
between targeted and actual proportions being less than or equal 
to 5%. In six countries (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and 
the United States), older participants were underrepresented in our 
sample by 6–15%. In one country (Germany), older participants 
were overrepresented by 6% (for details, see Supplementary Results; 
for figures depicting expected versus obtained counts in each gen-
der and age category, see Supplementary Figs. 7 and 8)
Main analyses. The main results are depicted in Figs. 2 and 3, across 
both the self-report and behavioural measures, respectively. As pre-
dicted, participants showed more trust in leaders who endorsed 
utilitarian views in impartial beneficence dilemmas and less trust in 
leaders who endorsed utilitarian views in instrumental harm dilem-
mas. This pattern of results was observed for each dilemma (Figs. 
2b and 3c) and was robust across countries (Fig. 4a,b). Following 
our pre-registered analysis plan (Analysis plan for hypothesis test-
ing), we examined self-report and behavioural measures of trust in 
two separate models, with results passing a corrected α of P ≤ 0.005 
being interpreted as ‘supportive evidence’ for our hypotheses, and 
results passing a corrected α of P < 0.05 being interpreted as ‘sugges-
tive evidence’ (all the CIs reported below are 97.5%).
Hypothesis 1: self-reported trust. To examine participants’ self-reported 
trust in the leaders, we fitted a linear mixed-effects model of the 
effect of argument type (utilitarian versus non-utilitarian), dimen-
sion type (instrumental harm versus impartial beneficence) and 
their interaction on the composite score of trust, adding demo-
graphic variables (gender, age, education, subjective socio-economic 
status (SES), political ideology and religiosity) and policy support as 
fixed effects and dilemmas and countries as random intercepts, with 
participants nested within countries (for details, see Analysis plan 
for hypothesis testing). As specified in Analysis plan, we also ran 
a model that included countries as random slopes of the two main 
Table 2 | Design table
Question Hypothesis Sampling plan Analysis plan interpretation







Participants will report 
higher trust in leaders 
who reject (versus 
endorse) instrumental 
harm, and higher trust 
in leaders who endorse 
(versus reject) impartial 
beneficence
Power analyses 
suggested that our 
planned sample size 
(N = 12,600) would be 
sufficient to achieve 
95% power to detect 
an effect size of 
d = 0.05
We will conduct a linear 
mixed-effects model of 
the effect of argument 
type, dimension type 
and their interaction on 
the composite measure 
of self-reported trust, 
controlling for demographic 
variables and participants’ 
own policy preferences
A significant interaction (after following up 
with post hoc tests) will be interpreted as 
evidence that endorsement of instrumental 
harm decreases general trust in leaders 
while endorsement of impartial beneficence 
increases general trust in leaders. Should 
the observed effect size of the interaction be 
statistically equivalent (with the larger of the 
two P values in the TOST using equivalence 
bounds set by the SESOI smaller than 
α = 0.05), this will be interpreted as evidence 
for null effects







Participants will be more 
likely to vote for a leader 
who rejects (versus 
endorses) instrumental 
harm, while they will be 
more likely to vote for 
a leader who endorses 
(versus rejects) impartial 
beneficence
Power analyses 
suggested that our 
planned sample size 
(N = 12,600) would be 
sufficient to achieve 
95% power to detect 
an odds ratio (OR) of 
1.30
We will conduct a 
generalized linear 
mixed-effects model with 
the logit link of the effect of 
dimension type on leader 
choice, controlling for 
demographic variables and 
participants’ own policy 
preferences
A significant main effect of dimension will 
be interpreted as evidence that endorsement 
of instrumental harm decreases trusting 
behaviour toward leaders, while endorsement 
of impartial beneficence increases trusting 
behaviour toward leaders. Should the observed 
effect size be statistically equivalent (with the 
larger of the two P values in the TOST using 
equivalence bounds set by the SESOI smaller 
than α = 0.05), this will be interpreted as 
evidence for null effects
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effects and the interactive effect; the results were consistent with the 
simpler model, but due to convergence issues with the more complex 
model, we report the simpler model.
We observed a significant main effect of argument type 
(B = −0.53, s.e. 0.02, t(17,562) = −24.81, P < 0.001, CI [−0.58, 
−0.48]), no significant main effect of dimension type (B = 0.10, s.e. 
0.10, t(3) = 0.95, P = 0.408, CI [−0.15, 0.35]) and, crucially, a signifi-
cant interaction between argument and dimension type (B = 2.12, 
s.e. 0.04, t(17,558) = 49.44, P < 0.001, CI [2.03, 2.22]). Post hoc com-
parisons with Bonferroni corrections confirmed that, in instrumen-
tal harm dilemmas, utilitarian leaders were seen as less trustworthy 
than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for utilitarian leaders 3.35, 
s.e. 0.09, CI [3.05, 3.65]; mean trust for non-utilitarian leaders 4.95, 
s.e. 0.09, CI [4.64, 5.25]; B = −1.60, s.e. 0.03, t(17,559) = −52.51, 
P < 0.001, CI [−1.66, −1.53]), but in impartial beneficence dilem-
mas this effect was reversed, such that utilitarian leaders were seen 
as more trustworthy than non-utilitarian leaders (mean trust for 
utilitarian leaders 4.51, s.e. 0.10, CI [4.14, 4.88]; mean trust for 
non-utilitarian leaders 3.98, s.e. 0.10, CI [3.61, 4.35]; B = 0.53, s.e. 
0.03, t(17,560) = 17.41, P < 0.001, CI [0.46, 0.60]; see Fig. 2a; for 
results by dilemma, see Fig. 2b; for results by country, see Fig. 4a).
Hypothesis 2: voting measure. To examine participants’ trust in 
the leaders as demonstrated by their voting behaviour, we fit-
ted a generalized linear mixed-effects model with the logit link of 
the effect of dimension type (instrumental harm versus impartial 
beneficence) on leader choice in the voting task (utilitarian versus 
non-utilitarian), adding demographic variables (gender, age, educa-
tion, subjective SES, political ideology and religiosity) and policy 
support as fixed effects and dilemmas and countries as random 
intercepts, with participants nested within countries (for details, 
see Analysis plan for hypothesis testing). This yielded a singular fit, 
so following our analysis plan, we reduced the complexity of the 
random-effects structure by only including dilemmas and countries 
as random intercepts. As specified in Analysis plan, we also ran 
a model that included countries as random slopes of the effect of 
dimension type; the results were consistent with the simpler model, 
but due to singularity issues (both with and without participants 
nested within countries), we report the simpler model.
We observed a significant main effect for dimension type 
(B = 1.37, s.e. 0.32, z = 4.21, P < 0.001, CI [0.41, 2.33], odds ratio 
(OR) 3.93) such that participants were almost four times more likely 
to choose the utilitarian leader in impartial beneficence dilemmas 
compared with instrumental harm dilemmas. Post hoc comparisons 
with Bonferroni corrections confirmed that, in instrumental harm 
dilemmas, participants were less likely to vote for utilitarian lead-
ers than non-utilitarian leaders (probability of choosing utilitarian 
leader 0.21, s.e. 0.04, CI [0.13, 0.31]), but in impartial beneficence 
dilemmas this effect vanished (probability of choosing utilitarian 
leader 0.50, s.e. 0.07, CI [0.34, 0.67]; see Fig. 3a; for model estimates, 
see Fig. 3b; for results by dilemma, see Fig. 3c; for results by country, 
see Fig. 4b).
Based on suggestions that logit and linear models should con-
verge and that linear models can in some cases be preferable63,64, 
we had also pre-registered the same analysis using a linear model 
(instead of a model with the logit link) with the identical fixed- 
and random-effects structures. However, the linear model yielded 
non-significant results for the main effect of dimension type with 
our Bonferroni-corrected alpha (B = 0.18, s.e. 0.05, t(3) = 3.73, 
P = 0.034, CI [0.07, 0.30]; probability of choosing utilitarian leader 
in instrumental harm dilemmas 0.30, s.e. 0.03, CI [0.16, 0.45], in 
impartial beneficence dilemmas 0.49, s.e. 0.04, CI [0.31, 0.67]). This 
discrepancy was unusual, since binomial and linear approaches 
most often give converging results65,66. Following our pre-registered 
analysis plan, we followed up on this non-significant result using 
the two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure to differentiate between 
insensitive versus null results. Given the equivalence bounds set 




















































































Self-report results Self-report results by dilemma
Utilitarian Non-utilitarian Utilitarian Non-utilitarian Utilitarian Non-utilitarian
Utilitarian Non-utilitarian Utilitarian Non-utilitarian
Fig. 2 | Self-reported trust in utilitarian and non-utilitarian leaders. a,b, Average trust in utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, with results collapsed 
across instrumental harm and impartial beneficence dilemmas (a) and separately for each of the instrumental harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Tracing and 
Ventilators) and impartial beneficence dilemmas (PPE and Medicine) (b) in the self-report task (N = 17,591). Non-utilitarian leaders were seen as more 
trustworthy than utilitarian leaders for instrumental harm dilemmas, while the reverse was observed for impartial beneficence dilemmas. Bars correspond 
to median scores; lower and upper hinges correspond to the first and third quartiles, respectively; and whiskers ends correspond to the most extreme data 
points within 1.5 times the interquartile range.
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ΔU = 0.15; Power analysis), the effect of dimension on leader choice 
(a 32% difference) was statistically not equivalent to zero (z = 20.77, 
P = 1.000 for the test with ΔU). This analysis, however, does not take 
into account the covariates specified in the models.
To resolve the discrepancy between our pre-registered binomial 
and linear models, we ran a number of additional exploratory mod-
els. These are described in Exploratory analyses section and sum-
marized in Table 3.
Robustness checks. Following our analysis plan, we verified the 
robustness of our findings in several ways. First, due to the changes 
in country-specific lockdown policies that were implemented 
between pre-registration and data collection, we ran a variation 
of our models which omitted the Lockdown dilemma. The results 
were substantially unchanged, both for the self-report task (inter-
action between argument and dimension type: B = 2.26, s.e. 0.05, 
t(17,640) = 48.56, P < 0.001, CI [2.16, 2.37]) and the voting task 
(main effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.29, s.e. 
0.39, z = 3.33, P < 0.001, CI [0.06, 2.52], OR 3.63) tasks.
In addition, because some countries had already implemented 
mandatory contact tracing schemes at the time of data collection, 
we ran a variation of our models in those countries only (namely 
China, India, Israel, Singapore and South Korea) with and without 
the Tracing dilemma. The results in those countries were similar 
when including and omitting the Tracing dilemma from the analysis, 
both for the self-report task (Tracing included: interaction between 
argument and dimension type: B = 1.13, s.e. 0.10, t(3,267) = 11.62, 
P < 0.001, CI [0.91, 1.35]; Tracing excluded: interaction between 
argument and dimension type: B = 1.55, s.e. 0.10, t(3,266) = 14.86, 
P < 0.001, CI [1.32, 1.78]) and voting task (Tracing included: main 
effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 0.98, s.e. 0.36, 
z = 2.70, P = 0.007, CI [−0.09, 2.07], OR 2.67; Tracing excluded: 
main effect for dimension type in binomial model: B = 1.32, s.e. 
0.14, z = 9.26, P < 0.001, CI [0.88, 1.78], OR 3.74). Finally, we 
also checked that the results in these countries were robust to 
order effects (that is, regardless of whether participants had seen 
the tracing dilemma prior to other dilemmas). To do this, we 
analysed participants’ responses with an additional covariate indicat-
ing whether the participant had seen the tracing dilemma in the prior 
task. Again, the results were substantially unchanged both for the 
self-report task (interaction between argument and dimension type: 
B = 1.13, s.e. 0.10, t(3,266) = 11.62, P < 0.001, CI [0.91, 1.35]) and 
the voting task (main effect for dimension type in binomial model: 
B = 1.11, s.e. 0.37, z = 3.01, P = 0.003, CI [0.03, 2.20], OR 3.03).
Exploratory analyses. Additional models for voting task. As noted 
above, our main pre-registered analysis for the voting task was a gen-
eralized linear mixed-effects model with the logit link of the effect of 
dimension type (instrumental harm versus impartial beneficence) 
on the leader choice (utilitarian versus non-utilitarian), with demo-
graphics and participants’ own policy preferences as fixed effects 
and dilemmas and countries as random intercepts (Table 2). This 
analysis confirmed our predictions, but we had also pre-registered 
the same analysis using a linear model (instead of logit link) with 
the identical fixed- and random-effects structure. As described 
above, the results from this model did not pass our pre-registered 
Bonferroni-corrected significance threshold. This discrepancy was 
unusual, given prior reports that linear and binomial models yield 
identical results in the vast majority of cases63,66. As a first check 
on this discrepancy, we assessed the fits of the binomial and linear 
models by fitting each with half the data, and predicting the leader 
choices in the remaining half. The mean difference between the pre-
dicted and observed values was lower in the binomial model (mean 
error 0.25) compared with the linear model (mean error 0.27; 
t(6,318) = −32.53, P < 0.001), suggesting that the binomial model is 
a better fit to our data.
Next, we ran a series of follow-up analyses to supplement our 
pre-registered, theoretically informed models. There are a vari-
ety of opinions for how to best level complex nested binary data 
like ours. For example, while random effects aid generalizability67, 
some advocate for modelling country variables as fixed rather than 
random effects to prevent increases in model bias68,69 or overly 
complex random-effects structures70. Moreover, while control-






























































































Voting results Model estimates Voting results by dilemma
Fig. 3 | Voting choices for utilitarian and non-utilitarian leaders. a, Percentage of participants who chose to trust utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, 
separately for instrumental harm and impartial beneficence dilemmas in the voting task (N = 12,638). b, Choices for utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders as 
estimated from a logit model including demographic variables (gender, age, education, subjective SES, political ideology and religiosity) and policy support as 
covariates, and dilemmas and countries as random intercepts (for details, see “Hypothesis 2: voting measure”). c, Percentage of participants who chose to trust 
utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, separately for each of the instrumental harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Tracing and Ventilators) and impartial beneficence 
dilemmas (PPE and Medicine). Non-utilitarian leaders were more likely to be voted for in instrumental harm dilemmas, but not in impartial beneficence 
dilemmas. Error bars represent standard error of the percentages (a) and (c), and the 97.5% CIs of the model estimates (b).
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our findings, some advocate for minimal use of covariates to pre-
vent type 1 error inflation71. Due to the discrepancy in the theo-
retically justified models that we had pre-registered and ongoing 
debates over the specifications of modelling such complex data, 
we ran a variety of models (described in detail in Supplementary 
Results and summarized in Table 3) with different link functions 
and different specifications of fixed and random effects, as well 
as robust random effects and randomization inference. Overall, 
all models led to the same conclusion: participants voted for the 
non-utilitarian leader more than the utilitarian leader in dilem-
mas about instrumental harm, but the reverse in impartial benefi-
cence dilemmas, with the utilitarian leader trusted more than the 
non-utilitarian leader – suggesting that the discrepancy between 
our pre-registered binomial and linear models was due to an overly 
complex random-effects structure.
Effects by country. To explore cross-cultural variation in trust in 
utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leaders, we ran additional mod-
els with country as a random slope and extracted the coefficients 
of interest (Fig. 4a,b). For the self-report task, we conducted a lin-
ear mixed-effects model of the effect of argument type (utilitarian 
versus non-utilitarian), dimension type (instrumental harm versus 
impartial beneficence) and their interaction on the composite score 
of trust, adding demographic variables (gender, age, education, 
subjective SES, political ideology and religiosity) and policy support 
as fixed effects and countries as a random slope of the interactive 
effect of argument and dimension. First, we confirmed that there 
was a significant interaction between argument and dimension type 
(B = 2.08, s.e. 0.16, t(21) = 13.08, P < 0.001, CI [1.71, 2.45]), consis-
tent with our pre-registered model. Next, we extracted the interac-
tion coefficients for each country, as well as the standard errors of 
the coefficients, with the estimates plotted in Fig. 4a. While there 
were some variations in the effect sizes, the results were remarkably 
consistent across countries. The predicted pattern of results was 
observed in all 22 countries, with Israel, South Korea and China 
showing the smallest effects and Brazil, the UAE and Norway show-
ing the largest effects.
For the voting task, we conducted a generalized linear 
mixed-effects model with the logit link of the effect of dimen-
sion type (instrumental harm versus impartial beneficence) on 
leader choice (utilitarian versus non-utilitarian), adding demo-
graphic variables (gender, age, education, subjective SES, political 
ideology and religiosity) and policy support as fixed effects and 
countries as a random slope of dimension. First, we confirmed 
there was a significant main effect for dimension type (B = 1.34, 
s.e. 0.07, z = 17.88, P < 0.001, CI [1.16, 1.51], OR 3.81), as in our 
pre-registered model. Next, we extracted the coefficients for 
each country, as well as the standard errors of the coefficients, 
and exponentiated them to get the odds ratios, with the result-
ing estimates plotted in Fig. 4b. Again, the results were remark-
ably consistent with the predicted pattern of results seen across all 
22 countries, with China, Israel and Canada showing the smallest 
effects and Norway, the UAE and the United States showing the 
largest effect size.
Correlations between self-report and behavioural measures across 
countries. The self-report and behavioural tasks employed in the cur-
rent study are highly complementary in several ways: for example, 
the former is more generalizable across different situations, while 
the latter is incentivized and more concrete (see Supplementary 
Note 10 for further details). To ensure that despite their superfi-
cial differences the tasks targeted the same construct, that is, trust 
in leaders, and measured robust preferences across countries, we 
checked that the effects of moral arguments and utilitarian dimen-
sions on these measures were correlated across countries. Indeed, 
we found that the coefficients of the interaction between moral 
argument and moral dimension on trust in the self-report task were 
significantly correlated with the effect of moral dimension on leader 
choice in the voting task (r = 0.76, P < 0.001; Fig. 4c).
Effects of participant exclusions in voting task. The main analyses 
reported above were performed on a subset of participants who 
passed the comprehension checks, as per our pre-registered sam-
pling plan (criterion 5; see Sampling plan). For the voting task, 
the observed pass rate (53.26%) was lower than the pre-registered 
expected pass rate (60%), suggesting that the comprehension check 
may have been overly stringent. Therefore, we conducted additional 
analyses to explore whether this pre-registered exclusion criterion 
might have affected the generalizability of our results across the 
study population in terms of education level.
Participants who failed the voting task comprehension check 
reported slightly lower educational attainment on average (mean 
5.32, s.e. 1.39, CI [5.30, 5.35]) than those who passed the compre-
hension check (mean 5.42, s.e. 1.37, CI [5.40, 5.45]; t(23,224) = 5.51, 
P < 0.001, d = 0.07). However, we observed similar results in our 
pre-registered models when including participants who failed the 
voting task comprehension check (main effect for dimension type 
in binomial model: B = 1.26, s.e. 0.28, z = 4.55, P < 0.001, CI [0.44, 
2.08], OR 3.53; main effect for dimension type in linear model: 
B = 0.17, s.e. 0.04, t(3) = 4.11, P = 0.026, CI [0.07, 0.27]).
Table 3 | Results for voting task models
Model 
type
Fixed effects Random 
effects
















 Binomial Dimension None 1.37 <0.001 0.32


























None 0.19 <0.001 0.19
Voting task results obtained with the pre-registered models, as well as a variety of exploratory 
models, including binomial and linear models (‘Model type’) with different specifications of fixed 
(‘Fixed effects’) and random effects (‘Random effects’). B indicates model coefficients of the effect 
of moral dimension on voting preference, P indicates significance value, and ‘Predicted difference’ 
indicates the expected difference in votes for utilitarian leaders in impartial beneficence versus 
instrumental harm dilemmas.
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Discussion
The COVID-19 pandemic has raised a number of moral dilem-
mas that engender conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
ethical principles. Building on past work on utilitarianism and trust, 
we tested the hypothesis that endorsement of utilitarian solutions 
to pandemic dilemmas would impact trust in leaders. Specifically, 
in line with suggestions from previous work and case studies of 
public communications during the early stages of the pandemic, we 
predicted that endorsing instrumental harm would decrease trust 
in leaders, while endorsing impartial beneficence would increase 
trust. Experiments conducted during November–December 2020 
in 22 countries across six continents (total N = 23,929; valid sample 
for self-report task 17,591; valid sample for behavioural task 12,638) 
provided robust support for our hypothesis. In the context of five 
realistic pandemic dilemmas, participants reported lower trust in 
leaders who endorsed instrumental sacrifices for the greater good 
and higher trust in leaders who advocated for impartially maxi-
mizing the welfare of everyone equally. In a behavioural measure 
of trust, only 28% of participants preferred to vote for a utilitar-
ian leader who endorsed instrumental harm, while 60% voted for 
an impartially beneficent utilitarian leader. These findings were 
robust to controlling for a variety of demographic characteristics 
as well as participants’ own policy preferences regarding the dilem-
mas. Although we observed some variation in effect sizes across 
the countries we sampled, the overall pattern of results was highly 
robust across countries. Our results suggest that endorsing utilitar-
ian approaches to moral dilemmas can both erode and enhance 
trust in leaders across the globe, depending on the type of utilitar-
ian morality.
We designed our set of dilemmas to rule out several alterna-
tive explanations for our findings, such as a general preference for 
less restrictive leaders (Supplementary Note 7), leaders who treat 
everyone equally (Supplementary Note 8) and leaders who seek to 
minimize COVID-19-related deaths (Supplementary Note 9). In 
addition, all of our results survived planned robustness checks to 
account for the possibility that local policies related to lockdowns or 
contact tracing could bias participants’ responses. Post hoc analyses 
demonstrated that our findings were highly consistent across the 
different dilemmas for instrumental harm (Lockdown, Tracing and 
Ventilators) and impartial beneficence (Medicine and PPE).
While the robustness of our findings across countries speaks 
to their broad cultural generalizability, further work is needed to 
understand the observed variations in effect sizes across countries. 
It seems plausible that both economic (for example, gross domestic 
product or socio-economic inequality) and cultural (for example, 
social network structure) differences across countries could explain 
some of the observed variations. One possibility, for example, is that 
country-level variations in tightness–looseness72, which have been 
associated with countries’ success in limiting cases in the COVID-
19 pandemic73, might moderate the effects of moral arguments on 
trust in leaders. Another direction for future research could be to 
explore how country-level social network structure might influence 
our results. Individuals in countries with a higher kinship index74 
and a more family-oriented social network structure, for example, 
might be less likely to trust utilitarian leaders, especially when the 
utilitarian solution conflicts with more local moral obligations.
There are several important limitations to the generalizability 
of our findings. First, although our samples were broadly nation-
ally representative for age and gender (with some exceptions; see 
Results), we did not assess representativeness of our samples on 
a number of other factors including education, income and geo-
graphic location. Second, while our results do concord with the 
limited existing research examining the effects of endorsing instru-
mental harm and impartial beneficence on perceived suitability as a 
leader37, and held across different examples of our pandemic-specific 
dilemmas, it of course remains possible that different results would 
be seen when judging leaders’ responses in other types of crises (for 
example, violent conflicts, natural disasters or economic crises) or 
at different stages of a crisis (for example, at the beginning versus 
later stages). Third, the reported experiments tested how responses 
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of dimension on votes for utilitarian
versus non-utilitarian leaders
Self-report task Voting task Consistency across countries
Fig. 4 | Trust in leaders by country as measured by the self-report and voting tasks. a, Predicted effect of moral dimension (instrumental harm versus 
impartial beneficence) and argument (utilitarian versus non-utilitarian) on trust in the self-report task (N = 17,591) for each country and overall. Dots 
represent model coefficients extracted from a model including country as a random slope of the interactive effect of moral dimension and argument 
(Exploratory analyses); error bars represent standard errors of the model coefficients. b, Odds ratio of the effect of moral dimension (instrumental harm 
versus impartial beneficence) on trust for the utilitarian versus non-utilitarian leader in the voting task (N = 12,638) for each country and overall. Dots 
represent odds ratios extracted from a model including country as a random slope of moral dimension (Exploratory analyses); error bars represent 
exponentiated standard errors of the model coefficients. c, Correlation between the country-level effect size estimates in the self-report task (x axis; also 
depicted in a) and voting task (y axis; also depicted in b). UAE, the United Arab Emirates; KSA, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
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to moral dilemmas influenced trust in anonymous, hypothetical 
political leaders. In the real world, however, people form and update 
impressions of known leaders with a history of political opinions 
and behaviours, and it is plausible that inferences of trustworthiness 
depend not just on a leader’s recent decisions but also on their history 
of behaviour, just as classic work on impression formation shows 
that the same information can lead to different impressions depend-
ing on prior knowledge about the target person75. Furthermore, we 
did not specify the gender of the leaders in our experiments (except 
in the voting task for China and for the Hebrew and Arabic transla-
tions, where it is not possible to indicate ‘leader’ without including 
a gendered pronoun; here it was translated in the masculine form). 
Past work conducted in the United States suggests that participants 
may default to an assumption that the leader is a man76, but it will 
be important for future work to assess whether men and women 
leaders are judged differentially for their moral decisions. Because 
women are typically stereotyped as being warmer and more com-
munal than men77, it is plausible that women leaders would face 
more backlash for making ‘cold’ utilitarian decisions, especially in 
the domain of instrumental harm. Fourth, because the current work 
focused on trust in political leaders, it remains unclear how utilitari-
anism would impact trust in people who occupy other social roles, 
such as medical workers or ordinary citizens. Fifth, and finally, it 
could be interesting to explore further the connection between 
impartial beneficence and intergroup psychology, especially with 
regards to teasing apart ‘impartiality’ and ‘beneficence’. For exam-
ple, even holding beneficence constant, a leader who advocates for 
impartially sharing resources with a rival country may be perceived 
differently from one who impartially shares with an allied country 
(and, while speculative, this distinction might explain why Israel 
was an outlier in impartial beneficence, being a country in a region 
with ongoing local conflicts).
Our results have clear implications for how leaders’ responses to 
moral dilemmas can impact how they are trusted. In times of global 
crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, leaders will necessarily face 
real, urgent and serious dilemmas. Faced with such dilemmas, deci-
sions have to be made, and our findings suggest that how leaders 
make these judgements can have important consequences, not just 
for whether they are trusted on the issue in question but also more 
generally. Importantly, this will be the case even when the leader has 
little direct control over the resolution. While a national leader (for 
example, a president or prime minister) has the power and respon-
sibility to resolve some moral dilemmas with policy decisions, not 
all political leaders (for example, as in our study, local mayors) have 
that power. A leader with little ability to directly impact the resolu-
tion of a moral dilemma might consider that voicing an opinion on 
that dilemma could reduce their credibility on other issues that they 
have more power to control.
To conclude, we investigated how trust in leaders is sensitive to 
how they resolve conflicts between utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
ethical principles in moral dilemmas during a global pandemic. Our 
results provide robust evidence that utilitarian responses to dilem-
mas can both erode and enhance trust in leaders: advocating for 
sacrificing some people to save many others (that is, instrumental 
harm) reduces trust, while arguing that we ought to impartially 
maximize the welfare of everyone equally (that is, impartial benefi-
cence) increases trust. Our work advances understanding of trust 
in political leaders and shows that, across a variety of cultures, it 
depends not just on whether they make moral decisions but also 
which specific moral principles they endorse.
Methods
Ethics information. Our research complies with all relevant ethical regulations. 
The study was approved by the Yale Human Research Protection Program 
Institutional Review Board (protocol IDs 2000027892 and 2000022385), the 
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Human Subjects Research Committee 
(request no. 20TrustCovR), the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences 
Ethics Committee (OE_0055) and the NHH Norwegian School of Economics 
Institutional Review Board (NHH-IRB 10/20). Informed consent was obtained 
from all participants.
Design. Overview. An overview of the experiment is depicted in Extended Data 
Fig. 1. After selecting their language, providing their consent and passing two 
attention checks, participants were told that they would “read about three different 
debates that are happening right now around the world”, that they would be given 
“some of the justifications that politicians and experts are giving for different 
policies”, and that they would be “ask[ed] some questions about [their] opinions”. 
They then completed two tasks measuring their trust in leaders expressing either 
utilitarian or non-utilitarian opinions (one using a behavioural measure and one 
using self-report measures, presented in a randomized order); these tasks were 
followed by questions about their impressions about the ongoing pandemic crisis, 
as well as individual difference and demographic measures, as detailed below. Data 
collection was performed blind to the conditions of the participants.
Both behavioural and self-report measures of trust involved five debates on 
the current pandemic crisis, three of which involved instrumental harm (IH) and 
two impartial beneficence (IB) (summarized in Fig. 1c and Table 1; for full text, see 
Supplementary Methods). Each of these five dilemmas were based on real debates 
that have been occurring during the COVID-19 pandemic, and we developed 
the philosophical components of each argument in consultation with moral 
philosophers.
 1. Lockdown (instrumental harm): whether the country should maintain 
severe restrictions on social gatherings until a vaccine is developed to prevent 
COVID-related deaths, or consider relaxing restrictions to maximize overall 
well-being
 2. Ventilators (instrumental harm): whether doctors should give everyone 
equal access to COVID treatment, or prioritize younger and healthier people
 3. Tracing (instrumental harm): whether the government should make it 
mandatory for residents to wear contact tracing devices to prevent pandemic 
spread, or make tracing devices optional to respect residents’ right to privacy
 4. Medicine (impartial beneficence): whether medicine developed in the home 
country should be reserved for treating the home country’s citizens, or sent 
wherever it can do the most good, even if that means sending it to other 
countries
 5. PPE (impartial beneficence): whether PPE manufactured in the home 
country should be reserved for protecting the home country’s citizens, or 
sent wherever it can do the most good, even if that means sending it to other 
countries
See Supplementary Notes 2 and 6–9 for further details of why we chose these 
specific dilemmas and how they can test our theoretical predictions.
Translations. Where the survey was administered in a non-English-speaking 
country, study materials were translated following a standard forward- and 
back-translation procedure78. First, for forward translation, a native speaker 
translated materials from English to the target language. Second, for back 
translation, a second native translator (who had not seen the original English 
materials) translated the materials back into English. Results were then 
compared, and if there were any substantial discrepancies, a second forward- and 
back-translation was conducted with translators working in tandem to resolve 
issues. Finally, the finished translated and back-translated materials were checked 
by researchers coordinating the experiment for that country.
Experimental design. Participants were randomly and blindly assigned to 
one of four conditions in the beginning of the experiment. These conditions 
corresponded to a 2 × 2 between-subjects design: 2 (moral dimension in the 
voting task: instrumental harm/impartial beneficence) × 2 (argument in the 
self-report task: utilitarian/non-utilitarian). In addition, we randomized the order 
of tasks (voting or self-report task first), the order of arguments in the voting task 
(utilitarian or non-utilitarian first), the order of dilemmas in the self-report task 
(Lockdown, Ventilators or Tracing first if instrumental harm, and PPE or Medicine 
first if impartial beneficence) and the dilemmas displayed (two in the self-report 
task and one in the voting task randomly chosen among Lockdown, Ventilators 
and Tracing if instrumental harm, and PPE and Medicine if impartial beneficence). 
This design allowed us to minimize demand characteristics with between-subjects 
manipulations of key experimental factors while at the same time maximizing 
efficiency of data collection.
Attention checks. We included two attention checks prior to the beginning of 
the experiment. Any participants who failed either of these were then screened 
out immediately. First, participants were told:“In studies like ours, there are 
sometimes a few people who do not carefully read the questions they are asked 
and just ‘quickly click through the survey.’ These random answers are problematic 
because they compromise the results of the studies. It is very important that you 
pay attention and read each question. In order to show that you read our questions 
carefully (and regardless of your own opinion), please answer ‘TikTok’ in the 
question on the next page”
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Then, on the next page, participants were given a decoy question: “When 
an important event is happening or is about to happen, many people try to get 
informed about the development of the situation. In such situations, where do you 
get your information from?”. Participants were asked to select among the following 
possible answers, displayed in a randomized order: TikTok, TV, Twitter, Radio, 
Reddit, Facebook, Youtube, Newspapers, Other. Participants who failed to follow 
our instructions and selected any answer other than the instructed one (“TikTok”) 
were then screened out of the survey. Second, participants were asked to read a 
short paragraph about the history and geography of roses. On the following page, 
they were asked to indicate which of six topics was not discussed in the paragraph. 
Participants who answered incorrectly were then screened out of the survey (with 
the exception of those who participated via Prolific, who were instead allowed to 
continue due to platform requirements).
Dilemma introduction. Both the voting and self-report tasks began with an 
introduction to a specific dilemma. In the voting task, participants viewed a 
single dilemma, and in the self-report task, participants viewed two dilemmas in 
randomized order (see Extended Data Fig. 1 for details). No participant saw the 
same dilemma in both the voting and self-report tasks.
The dilemma introduction consisted of a short description of the dilemma 
(for example, in the PPE dilemma: “Imagine that […] there will soon be another 
global shortage of personal protective equipment [… and] political leaders are 
debating how personal protective equipment should be distributed around the 
globe.”), followed by a description of two potential policies (for example, in the PPE 
dilemma, US participants read: “[S]ome are arguing that PPE made in American 
factories should be sent wherever it can do the most good, even if that means 
sending it to other countries. Others are arguing that PPE made in American 
factories should be kept in the U.S., because the government should focus on 
protecting its own citizens.”).
After reading about the dilemma, participants were asked to provide their own 
opinion about the best course of action (“Which policy do you think should be 
adopted?”), answered on a 1–7 scale, with the endpoints (1 and 7) representing 
strong preferences for one of the policies (for example, in the PPE dilemma, they 
were labelled “Strongly support U.S.-made PPE being reserved for protecting 
American citizens” and “Strongly support U.S.-made PPE being given to whoever 
needs it most”, respectively), and the midpoint (4) representing indifference 
(“Indifferent”). See Supplementary Note 13 for further details. As an exploratory 
measure that is not analysed for the purposes of the current report, participants 
also indicated how morally wrong it would be for politicians to endorse the 
utilitarian approach in each dilemma.
For full text of dilemmas and introduction questions, see Supplementary 
Methods.
Voting task. Our behavioural measure of trust in the current studies is based on a 
novel task with two types of participants: voters and donors. Voters were asked to 
cast a vote for a leader who would be responsible for making a charitable donation 
to UNICEF on behalf of a group of donors and would have the opportunity to 
‘embezzle’ some of the donation money for themselves (Fig. 1d).
We collected data from donors first. A few days before we ran our main 
experiment, a convenience sample of US participants (N = 100) was recruited 
from Prolific and was provided with a US$2 bonus endowment. They were given 
the opportunity to donate up to their full bonus to UNICEF. After making their 
donation decision, they read about the five COVID-19 dilemmas, in randomized 
order, and indicated which policy they thought should be adopted. Finally, they 
were instructed that they might be selected to be responsible for the entire group’s 
donations to UNICEF. Participants were told that, if they were selected, they would 
have the opportunity to keep up to the full amount of total group donations for 
themselves, and were asked to indicate how much of the group’s donations they 
would keep for themselves if they were selected to be responsible.
Our main experiment focused on the behaviour of voter participants. In the 
voting task, participants were randomly assigned to read about one dilemma, 
randomly selected amongst the five dilemmas summarized in Table 1. After 
completing the dilemma introduction, participants were asked to “make a choice 
that has real financial consequences” and told that “[a] few days ago, a group of 100 
people were recruited via an international online marketplace and invited to make 
donations to the charitable organization UNICEF. In total, they donated an amount 
equivalent to $87.89”. We instructed participants that we would like them to “vote 
for a leader to be responsible for the entire group’s donations”. Crucially, they were 
also told that “[t]he leader has two options: They can transfer the group’s $87.89 
donation to UNICEF in full, or [t]hey can take some of this money for themselves 
(up to the full amount) and transfer whatever amount is left to UNICEF”. The exact 
donation amount was determined by the actual donation choices of the donor 
participants.
Following these details, participants were asked to cast a vote for the leadership 
position between two people who had also read about the same dilemma they 
had just read about. Participants were instructed that one person agreed with 
the utilitarian argument while the other person agreed with the non-utilitarian 
argument. This information was displayed to participants on the same page, in a 
randomized order. Participants were then asked to vote for the person they wished 
to be responsible for the group’s donations. We instructed participants that we 
would later identify the winner of the election, and implement their choice by 
distributing payments to the leader and UNICEF accordingly.
After completing the voting task, voter participants were asked the following 
comprehension question: “In the last page, you were asked to choose a leader 
that will be entrusted with the group’s donation. Please select the option that best 
describes what the leader will be able to do with the donation”. They were asked to 
select between three options, displayed in randomized order:
 1. The leader can transfer the full donation to UNICEF or take some of the 
money for themselves.
 2. The leader is not able to do anything with the donation.
 3. The leader chooses how much of the group’s donation to keep for themselves 
and how much to return to the people who donated the money.
We excluded voter participants who failed to select the correct answer (1), as 
per our exclusion criteria (Exclusions). Note that in our stage 1 Registered Report 
the answer choices were slightly different, but we revised them after discovering 
in a soft launch that participants were systematically choosing one of the incorrect 
options, suggesting that the question was poorly worded. In consultation with the 
editor, we clarified the response options and began the data collection procedure 
anew. This was one of only three deviations from the stage 1 report (the others 
being that data collection took four weeks instead of the two weeks we had 
anticipated, and the use of Prolific instead of Lucid for recruitment in the United 
Kingdom and the United States).
After collecting the votes from the voter participants, we randomly selected ten 
donor participants to be considered for the leadership position: one who endorsed 
the utilitarian position for each of the five dilemmas and one who endorsed the 
non-utilitarian position for each of the five dilemmas. After tallying the votes from 
voter participants, we implemented the choices of each of the elected leaders and 
made the payments accordingly. For full text of instructions and questions for both 
the donor and the voting task, see Supplementary Methods.
Self-reported trust. Participants read about two dilemmas on the dimension of 
utilitarianism that they did not encounter in the voting task. That is, participants 
assigned to an instrumental harm dilemma (Lockdown, Ventilators or Tracing) 
for the voting task read both impartial beneficence dilemmas (PPE and Medicine) 
for the self-report task, while participants assigned to an impartial beneficence 
dilemma (PPE or Medicine) for the voting task read a randomly assigned two out 
of three instrumental harm dilemmas (Lockdown, Ventilators and Tracing) for the 
self-report task. The structure of the introduction to the dilemmas was identical 
to that in the voting task: they read a short description of the issue, followed by a 
description of two potential policies. On separate screens, they were asked which 
policy they themselves support.
After providing their own opinions, participants were asked to imagine that 
the mayor of a major city in their region was arguing for one of the two policies, 
providing either a utilitarian or non-utilitarian argument. Each participant 
was randomly assigned to read about leaders making either utilitarian or 
non-utilitarian arguments in both dilemmas presented in the self-report task. After 
reading about the leader’s opinion and argument, they were then be asked to report 
their general trust in the leader (“How trustworthy do you think this person is?”), 
to be answered on a 1–7 scale, with labels “Not at all trustworthy”, “Somewhat 
trustworthy” and “Extremely trustworthy” at points 1, 4 and 7, respectively. On 
a separate page they were then asked to report their trust in the leader’s advice 
on other issues (“How likely would you be to trust this person’s advice on other 
issues?”), to be answered on a 1–7 scale, with labels “Not at all likely”, “Somewhat 
likely” and “Extremely likely” at points 1, 4 and 7, respectively.
After completing the self-report task, participants were asked the following 
comprehension question: “In the last page, you read about a mayor in a city in your 
region, and were asked about them. Please select the option that best describes the 
questions you were asked”. Their options, displayed in a randomized order, were: 
(1) “How much I agreed with the mayor”, (2) “How much I trusted the mayor”, and 
(3) “How much I admired the mayor”. This allowed us to exclude participants who 
failed to select the correct answer (2), as per our exclusion criteria (Exclusions).
For full text of instructions and questions for the self-report task, see 
Supplementary Methods.
COVID concern. To assess their attitudes toward and experience with the 
pandemic, participants were asked three questions. Two measured how 
concerned participants currently felt about the pandemic, on both health-related 
and economic grounds (“How concerned are you about the health-related 
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic?” and “How concerned are you about 
the financial and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic?”, both to be 
answered on a 1–7 scale, with labels “Not at all” and “Very much” at points 1 and 7, 
respectively). The third question measured their personal involvement (“Have you 
or anyone else you know personally suffered significant health consequences as a 
result of COVID-19?”, to be answered by selecting one of three options: “Yes”, “No” 
and “Unsure”).
Oxford Utilitarianism Scale. All participants then completed the Oxford 
Utilitarianism Scale33. The scale consists of nine items in two subscales: 
instrumental harm (OUS-IH) and impartial beneficence (OUS-IB). The 
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OUS-IB subscale consists of five items that measure endorsement of impartial 
maximization of the greater good, even at great personal cost (for example, “It 
is morally wrong to keep money that one doesn’t really need if one can donate it 
to causes that provide effective help to those who will benefit a great deal”). The 
OUS-IH subscale consists of four items relating to willingness to cause harm so 
as to bring about the greater good (for example, “It is morally right to harm an 
innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other 
innocent people”). Participants viewed all questions in a randomized order, and 
answered on a 1–7 scale, with labels “Strongly disagree”, “Disagree”, “Somewhat 
disagree”, “Neither agree nor disagree”, “Somewhat agree”, “Agree” and “Strongly 
agree”.
Demographics. All participants were asked to report their gender, age, years 
spent in education, subjective SES, education (on the same scale, but with minor 
changes in the scale labels across countries), political ideology (using an item 
from the World Values Survey) and religiosity. These questions were the same 
across countries and represent the demographics used as covariates in the main 
analyses. Additionally, participants were asked to indicate their region of residence 
(for example for the United States, “Which US State do you currently live in?”), 
and ethnicity/race, with the specific wording and response options depending 
on the local context (in France and Germany, this was not collected due to local 
regulations). In addition, participants were asked to confirm their country of 
residence, which allowed us to exclude participants who reported living in a 
country different from that of intended recruitment, as per our exclusion criteria 
(Exclusions).
Debriefing questions. Finally, participants were asked a series of debriefing 
questions. Two of these assessed their participation in other COVID-related 
studies (“Approximately how many COVID-related studies have you participated 
in before this one?”, answered by selecting one of the following options: “0”, “1–5”, 
“6–10”, “11–20”, “21–50”, “More than 50” and “I don’t remember”, and “If you have 
participated in any other COVID-related studies, how similar were they to this 
one?”, to be answered by selecting one of the following options: “Extremely similar”, 
“Very similar”, “Moderately similar”, “Slightly similar”, “Not at all similar” and “Not 
applicable”).
An additional question assessed participants’ attitudes towards the charity 
involved in the voting task (“How reliable do you think UNICEF is as an 
organization in using donations for helping people?”, answered on a 1–5 scale, with 
labels “Not reliable at all”, “Somewhat reliable” and “Very reliable” at points 1, 3 and 
5, respectively).
Analysis plan. Pre-processing. Exclusions. We planned to exclude data either at 
the participant level as outlined in Sampling plan section, based on criteria 1 
(duplicate response), 2 (different residence) and 3 (partial completion), or on an 
analysis-by-analysis basis as outlined in criteria 4 (missing variables) and 5 (failed 
comprehension checks).
Outliers. All participants’ responses were analysed, regardless of whether they were 
statistical outliers.
Computation of composite measures. Composite measures of self-reported trust 
were created by averaging responses to the two trust questions (trustworthiness 
of the leader and trust in the leader’s advice on other issues), separately for each 
participant and dilemma. In addition, we created composite OUS scores for each 
participant by averaging their responses on the scale items, separately for the 
instrumental harm (four items) and impartial beneficence subscales (five items).
Analysis plan for hypothesis testing. We planned to examine behavioural 
measures and self-report measures of trust in two separate models. For testing 
our hypotheses across all countries, we set a significance threshold of α = 0.0025 
(Bonferroni corrected for two tests). All analyses were conducted in R using the 
packages lme479, lmerTest80, estimatr81, emmeans82, ggeffects83, ri284 and glmnet85. 
We planned that, in the event of convergence or singularity issues, we would 
supplement the theoretically appropriate models described below with simplified 
models by reducing the complexity of the random-effects structure86.
Hypothesis 1: self-reported trust. To examine participants’ self-reported trust in 
the leaders, we planned to examine the composite measure of their trust in each 
leader (that is, the average of the two trust questions, computed separately for each 
participant and dilemma). We hypothesized that participants would report higher 
trust in non-utilitarian leaders compared with utilitarian leaders in the context 
of dilemmas involving instrumental harm, while the opposite pattern would be 
observed for impartial beneficence. To test this hypothesis, we planned to conduct 
a linear mixed-effects model of the effect of argument type (utilitarian versus 
non-utilitarian), dimension type (instrumental harm versus impartial beneficence) 
and their interaction on the composite score of trust, adding demographic 
variables (gender, age, education, subjective SES, political ideology and religiosity) 
and policy support as fixed effects and dilemmas and countries as random 
intercepts, with participants nested within countries. In addition, we planned to 
run a model that included countries as random slopes of the two main effects 
and the interactive effect. We said that, should the model converge and should 
the results differ from the simpler model proposed above, we would compare 
model fits using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and retain the model 
that better fits the data, while still reporting the other in supplementary materials. 
We planned to follow up on significant effects with post hoc comparisons using 
Bonferroni corrections. For the purposes of the analysis, we used effect coding 
such that, for argument type, the non-utilitarian condition was coded as −0.5 and 
the utilitarian condition as 0.5, and for the dimension type, instrumental harm 
was coded as −0.5 and impartial beneficence as 0.5. The demographic covariates 
were grand-mean-centred; the gender variable was dummy coded with “woman” as 
baseline. P values were computed using Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees 
of freedom as implemented in lmerTest. For analysis code, see https://osf.io/
m9tpu/.
Hypothesis 2: voting measure. To examine participants’ trust in the leaders as 
demonstrated by their behaviour, we planned to examine their choices in the 
voting task, where they were asked to select which of two leaders (one making a 
utilitarian argument and the other a non-utilitarian one) to entrust with a group 
charity donation. We hypothesized that participants would be more likely to select 
the non-utilitarian leader over the utilitarian leader when reading about their 
arguments for dilemmas involving instrumental harm, while the opposite pattern 
would be observed for impartial beneficence. To test this hypothesis, we planned 
to conduct a generalized linear mixed-effects model with the logit link of the effect 
of dimension type (instrumental harm versus impartial beneficence) on the leader 
choice (utilitarian versus non-utilitarian), adding demographic variables (gender, 
age, education, subjective SES, political ideology and religiosity) and policy support 
as fixed effects and dilemmas and countries as random intercepts, with participants 
nested within countries. In addition, we said we would also run a model that 
includes countries as random slopes of the effect of dimension type. Should the 
model converge and should the results differ from the simpler model proposed 
above, we planned to compare model fits using the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and retain the model that better fits the data, while still reporting the other 
in supplementary materials. Based on recent reports that linear models might be 
preferable to logistic models in treatment designs63,64, we said we would run the 
same analysis using a linear model (instead of logit link) with the identical fixed 
and random effects and again adjudicate between the models using the AIC. We 
planned to follow up on any significant effects observed with post hoc comparisons 
using Bonferroni corrections. For the purposes of this analysis, we planned to 
use effect coding such that, for the binary response variable of argument type, the 
non-utilitarian trust response was coded as 0 and the utilitarian trust response as 
1, and for the dimension type, instrumental harm was coded as −0.5 and impartial 
beneficence as 0.5. Again, the demographic covariates were grand-mean-centred; 
the gender variable was dummy coded with “woman” as baseline. P values 
were computed using Satterthwaite’s approximation for degrees of freedom as 
implemented in lmerTest. For analysis code, see https://osf.io/m9tpu/.
Robustness checks. Because there was evidence that public perceptions of 
lockdowns at the time of data collection were changing relative to July 2020 when 
we ran our pilots87,88, which may affect responses to the Lockdown dilemma, we 
planned to examine the robustness of our findings using two variations of the 
models described above, one that includes the Lockdown dilemma and another 
that omits it.
As some of the countries in our sample already implement mandatory and/
or invasive contact tracing schemes at the time of writing (China, India, Israel, 
Singapore and South Korea), which may affect responses to the Tracing dilemma, 
we also planned to examine the robustness of our findings in these countries 
using two variations of the models described above, one that includes the Tracing 
dilemma and another that omits it. Furthermore, in this subset of countries 
we planned to examine an order effect to test whether completing the Tracing 
dilemma in the first task affects behaviour on the subsequent task.
Null hypothesis testing. In the event of non-significant results from the approaches 
outlined above, we planned to employ the TOST procedure89 to differentiate 
between insensitive versus null results. In particular, we planned to specify lower 
and upper equivalence bounds based on standardized effect sizes set by our SESOI 
(Power analysis and Table 2). For each of our two tasks, should the larger of the two 
P values from the two t tests be smaller than α = 0.05, we would conclude statistical 
equivalence. For example, the minimum guaranteed sample size (N = 12,600; see 
Sample size for details) would give us over 95% power to detect an effect size of 
d = 0.05 in the self-report task, yielding standardized ΔL = −0.05 and ΔU = 0.05, and 
an OR of 1.30 in the voting task, yielding standardized ΔL = −0.15 and ΔU = 0.15.
Sampling plan. Participants. We planned to complete the study online with 
participants in the following countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Denmark, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States (Fig. 1a). We 
sampled on every inhabited continent and included countries that have been more 
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or less severely affected by COVID-19 on a variety of metrics (Supplementary  
Fig. 1). Country selection was determined primarily on a convenience basis. In 
April 2020, the senior author put out a call for collaborators via social media and 
email. Potential collaborators were asked whether they had the capacity to recruit up 
to 1,000 participants representative for age and gender within their home country. 
After the initial set of collaborators was established, we added additional countries 
to diversify our sample with respect to geographic location and pandemic severity.
We planned to recruit participants via online survey platforms (Supplementary 
Table 1) and compensate them financially for their participation in accordance 
with local standard rates. We aimed to recruit samples that were nationally 
representative with respect to age and gender where feasible. We anticipated 
that this would be feasible for many but not all countries in our study (see 
Supplementary Table 1 for details). We originally anticipated sampling to take 
place over a 14-day period, but to allow for more representative sampling (after 
discussion with the editor), we collected data over a period of 27 days (26 
November 2020 to 22 December 2020). All survey materials were translated into 
the local language (see Translations for details). Prior to the survey, all participants 
read and approved a consent form outlining their risks and benefits, confirmed 
they agreed to participate in the experiment and completed two attention checks. 
Participants who failed to agree to the consent or failed to pass the attention checks 
were not permitted to complete the survey (with the exception of participants 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, who due to recruitment platform 
requirements were instead allowed to continue the survey, and were only excluded 
after data collection).
Expected effect sizes. We informed our expected effect sizes by examining the 
published literature on utilitarianism and trust. Previous studies of social 
impressions of utilitarians reveal effect sizes in the range of d = 0.19–0.78 (mean 
d = 0.78 for the effect of instrumental harm on self-reported moral impressions; 
mean d = 0.19 for the effect of impartial beneficence on self-reported moral 
impressions; mean d = 0.55 for interactive effects of instrumental harm and 
impartial beneficence on self-reported moral impressions)35–39. However, there are 
several important caveats with using these past studies to inform expected effect 
sizes for the current study. First, past studies have measured trust in ordinary 
people, while we study trust in leaders, and there is evidence that instrumental 
harm and impartial beneficence differentially impact attitudes about leaders versus 
ordinary people37. Second, past studies have investigated artificial moral dilemmas, 
while we study real moral dilemmas in the context of an ongoing pandemic. Third, 
past studies have been conducted in a small number of Western countries (the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Germany), while we sample across a much 
wider range of countries on six continents. Finally, for the voting task, it is more 
challenging to estimate an expected effect size because no previous studies to our 
knowledge have used such a task.
Because of the caveats described above, we also informed our expectations of 
effect sizes with data from pilot 2, which was identical to the proposed studies in 
design apart from using The Red Cross instead of UNICEF in the voting task and 
the omission of the Tracing dilemma (see Pilot data in Supplementary Information 
for a full description of the pilot experiments). Pilot 2 revealed a conventionally 
medium effect size for the interaction between argument and moral dimension 
in the self-report task (B = 2.88, s.e. 0.24, t(452) = 11.80, P < 0.001, CI [2.41, 3.35], 
d = 0.55) and a conventionally large effect size for the effect of moral dimension 
in the voting task (B = 2.41, s.e. 0.33, z = 7.30, P < 0.001, CI [1.77, 3.13], OR 11.13, 
d = 1.33).
Sample size. Sample size was determined based on a cost–benefit analysis 
considering available resources and expected effect sizes that would be theoretically 
informative89 (Expected effect sizes). We aimed to collect the largest sample 
possible with resources available and verified with power analyses that our planned 
sample would be able to detect effect sizes that are theoretically informative and at 
least as large as expected based on prior literature (Power analysis). We expected to 
collect a sample of 21,000 participants in total, which conservatively accounting for 
exclusion rates up to 40% (Exclusions) would lead to a final guaranteed minimum 
sample of 12,600 participants.
Power analysis. We conducted a series of power analyses to determine the smallest 
effect sizes that our minimum guaranteed sample of 12,600 participants would be 
able to detect with 95% power and an α level of 0.005, separately for each main 
model (see Analysis plan for further details). To account for these two hypothesis 
tests, for all power analyses we applied Bonferroni corrections for two tests, thus 
yielding an α of 0.0025. Following recent suggestions90,91, results passing a corrected 
α of P ≤ 0.005 are interpreted as ‘supportive evidence’ for our hypotheses, while 
results passing a corrected α of P < 0.05 are interpreted as ‘suggestive evidence’. 
Power analyses were conducted using Monte Carlo simulations92 via the R package 
simr93, with 1,000 simulations, using estimates of means and variances from 
pilot 2 (see Pilot data in Supplementary Information for a full description of the 
pilot experiments; note that, for the purposes of the current simulations, the 
race variable was omitted from data analysis because this variable is not readily 
comparable across countries). Data and code for power analyses can be found at 
https://osf.io/m9tpu/.
First, we considered the interactive effect of moral dimension (instrumental 
harm versus impartial beneficence) and argument (utilitarian versus 
non-utilitarian) on trust in the self-report task. We estimated that a sample 
of 12,600 participants would provide over 95% power to detect an effect size 
of d = 0.05 (power 99.3%, CI [98.56, 99.72]). This effect size is 9% of what we 
observed in pilot 2 and is the SESOI for the self-report task.
Next, we considered the effect of moral dimension (instrumental harm versus 
impartial beneficence) on leader choice in the voting task. We estimated that a 
sample of 12,600 participants would provide over 95% power to detect an odds 
ratio of 1.30 (power 95.8%, CI [94.36, 96.96]). This effect size is 9% of what we 
observed in pilot 2 and is the SESOI for the voting task.
Given that these SESOI values are detectable at 95% power with our guaranteed 
sample (total N = 12,600), are theoretically informative and are lower than our 
expected effect sizes (Expected effect sizes), we concluded that our sample is 
sufficient to provide over 95% power for testing our hypotheses and that our study 
is highly powered to detect useful effects.
At the time of submission, online survey platform representatives indicated 
that, while it is normally feasible to recruit samples nationally representative for 
age and gender in most of our target countries, due to the ongoing pandemic, final 
sample sizes may be unpredictable and in some countries it would not be possible 
to achieve fully representative quotas for some demographic categories, including 
women and older people (see Supplementary Table 1 for details). We planned that, 
if this issue arose, we would prioritize statistical power over representativeness. If 
we were unable to achieve representativeness for age and/or gender in particular 
countries, we planned to note this explicitly in the Results section.
Exclusions. We planned to exclude participants from all further analyses if they met 
at least one of the following criteria: (1) they had taken the survey more than once 
(as indicated by IP address or worker ID); (2) they reported in a question about 
their residence (further described in Design) that they lived in a country different 
from that of intended recruitment; (3) they did not answer more than 50% of the 
questions. In addition, participants would be selectively excluded from specific 
analyses if they (4) did not provide a response and are thus missing variables 
involved in the analysis or (5) failed the comprehension check (further described in 
Design) for the task involved in the specific analysis.
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the 
Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
All data and materials are openly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) 
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How much do you trust this leader?
Dilemma introduction











Leader 1: Utilitarian or Leader 2: Non-Utilitarian
or Leader 2: Non-UtilitarianLeader 1: Utilitarian
Lockdown, Tracing, or VentilatorsMedicine or PPE
Lockdown, Tracing, or Ventilators
and Leader 2: Non-Utilitarian
Leader 1: Utilitarian




Extended Data Fig. 1 | Overview of experimental design. Across subjects, we randomized the order of the voting and self-report tasks, the order of 
dilemmas in the self-report task, and the order of leaders in the voting task.
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Data exclusions As specified in our pre-registered sampling plan, participants who did not pass the attention checks were screened out immediately 
prior to beginning the survey, but due to platform and IRB requirements, participants in the US and UK were able to complete the 
survey even if they failed such checks, and so they were excluded post hoc, after data collection (N = 101 for attention check 1, N = 
118 for attention check 2). In addition, participants were excluded according to our exclusion criteria if they (1) took the survey more 
than once (N = 565); (2) reported living in a different country than that of intended recruitment (N = 96, of which 4 did not answer 
the question); or (3) failed to answer more than 50% of the questions (N = 0). The sample size after applying these exclusion criteria 
was 23,929; we then excluded participants from specific analyses if they (4) did not provide a response for one of our main 
dependent variables (N = 177 for self-report, N = 201 for voting); or (5) failed the comprehension check for the task being analyzed 
(N = 6,161 for self-report, N = 11,090 for voting). This resulted in a total final sample of N = 17,591 for the self-report task, and N = 
12,638 for the voting task.
Non-participation On the first page of the survey we had a consent form; 175 participants did not consent to take part and 111 were under the age of 
18, and these participants were then screened out of the survey before going further. 
Randomization Participants were randomly assigned to one of 4 conditions in the beginning of the experiment. These conditions corresponded to a 
2x2 between-subjects design: 2 (moral dimension in the voting task: Instrumental Harm/Impartial Beneficence) x 2 (argument in the 
self-reported trust task: Utilitarian/Non-Utilitarian). In addition, we randomized the order of tasks (voting or self-reported trust first), 
the order of arguments in the voting task (Utilitarian or Non-Utilitarian first), the order of dilemmas in the self-reported trust 
(Lockdown, Ventilators, or Tracing first if Instrumental Harm, and PPE or Medicine first if Impartial Beneficence), and the dilemmas 
displayed (two in the self-reported trust task and one in the voting task randomly chosen among Lockdown, Ventilators, and Tracing 
if Instrumental Harm, and PPE and Medicine if Impartial Beneficence).
Reporting for specific materials, systems and methods
We require information from authors about some types of materials, experimental systems and methods used in many studies. Here, indicate whether each material, 
system or method listed is relevant to your study. If you are not sure if a list item applies to your research, read the appropriate section before selecting a response. 
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Policy information about studies involving human research participants
Population characteristics See above
Recruitment Participants were recruited through online survey recruitment marketplaces.
Ethics oversight The study was approved by the Yale Human Research Protection Program Institutional Review Board (Protocol IDs: 
2000027892 and 2000022385), the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Human Subjects Research Committee (Request 
Number 20TrustCovR), the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences Ethics Committee (OE_0055), and the NHH Norwegian 
School of Economics Institutional Review Board (NHH-IRB 10/20). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Note that full information on the approval of the study protocol must also be provided in the manuscript.
